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1. Introduction
Present-day Central and Eastern European agriculture is characterized by a bimodal
farm structure with a very large amount of small-scale farms and a small amount of large
farms organized as a company or cooperative.  More than ten years after transition has begun,
markets have not fully developed yet and market-based middle-sized farms are rare (Sarris et
al., 1999).  Many small-scale farmers produce only for own consumption and cannot find
their way to the market place.  The transition towards a market economy seem to have passed
many of these smallholders.  The existence of many small farms poses problems for those
countries that are preparing for accession to the European Union.  The latter is not prepared
to extend its generous direct income payment scheme to Eastern European countries without
qualifications.
Why there are so many farms in Central and Eastern Europe, and more specifically,
why are so many among them not producing for the market?  It has been argued that
subsistence has been triggered by macroeconomic instability resulting in high unemployment
and high inflation, and that it persists mainly because of the adverse income and employment
situation in rural areas.  In this paper, we use survey data from four Central and Eastern
European countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary), collected in the period 1998-
2000 in the framework of two EU Phare ACE research projects, to investigate the impact of
farm household characteristics and endowments on subsistence.
2. Subsistence agriculture in transition economies: definition and determinants
The term subsistence can refer to different levels of analysis or aggregation, such as
subsistence production, subsistence levels of living, subsistence agriculture, subsistence3
economy and subsistence farmer.  Particularly concerning the latter there is no consensus
definition.  However, most scholars would agree that subsistence farming can be associated
with poverty, low levels of technology, inefficient production and low levels of
commercialization.  Subsistence farming thus limits development.  Moreover, subsistence
farmers are not very responsive to market and policy signals (Wharton, 1969; Lerman, 2001a;
von Braun and Lohlein, 2001; Brüntrup and Heidhues, 2002).  A problem with defining
subsistence is that it can be approached from the point of view of consumption as well as
production, but also that any subsistence indicator moves along a gradient from 0 to 100%.
Hence, distinguishing between subsistence and market-orientation is always arbitrary
(Brüntrup and Heidhues, 2002).
The factors influencing subsistence and commercialization are complex, as most of them
interact.
1  Rather than presenting a full theoretical model, we discuss some of the major
factors as identified in the relatively scarce literature on subsistence agriculture in transition
economies.
2.1 Initial conditions and factor endowments
An economy’s initial conditions play a prominent role in economic behavior and
performance in transition, as they influence the choice of reform policies and thus the
reallocation of factor endowments.  Macours and Swinnen (2002) show how differences in
initial conditions between transition countries in Europea and Asia have triggered different
reform paths.  Mathijs and Swinnen (1998) have observed that the shift towards individual
farms has been more pronounced in countries characterized with a large share of their labor
force in agriculture and a low land-to-man ratio.
A key production factor in agricultural production is land, so the ways various
government dealt with land privatization and reprivatization provide an important initial
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of market imperfections and transaction costs on commercialization, and Tritten and Sarris (1999, 2001) for4
condition for further behavior.  Most Central European countries have restituted (or
“reprivatized”) land previously cultivated by collective farms to the pre-communist owners.
Notable exceptions are Hungary, where part of the collective land was auctioned to former
owners and another part was given to the member-workers of collective farms; Romania,
where part of the collective land was allocated to member-workers; and Albania, where land
was distributed equally on a per capita basis (Swinnen, 1999; Lerman, 2001b).  The resulting
pattern of land ownership is one of extreme fragmentation and old to very old landlords.
However, fragmented ownership does not automatically imply fragmented cultivation.
Mathijs and Swinnen (1998) noted that fragmented ownership may lead to high transaction
costs of withdrawing land from the collective farm.  As a result, restitution may actually
conserve the pre-reform farm structure.  For example, in Slovakia, the bulk of the land is still
cultivated by large-scale cooperatives and companies, despite the restitution of land to former
owners.
More land means more surplus and sales, ceteris paribus.  For example, Lerman and
Mirzakhanian (2001) found that in Armenia sellers have considerably larger land holdings
than non-sellers.  World Bank surveys in transition countries consistently reveal a willingness
to increase farm size (Lerman, 2001a).  However, initial conditions, such as the way land has
been (re)privatized, may have a double impact on subsistence. On the one hand, restitution
seems to have locked the agricultural sector into a dual farm structure brought about by
reform.  There is no sizeable amount of middle-sized farms, as land markets continue to fail
to correct inefficient farm structures (Sarris et al., 1999).  On the other hand, the reforms have
given some people the opportunity to enlarge the household plots they were cultivating under
communism, or to get access to land altogether, thus improving their livelihood.
                                                                                                                                                                           
recent applications to transition agriculture.5
2.2. Household characteristics, risk and imperfect markets for labor and insurance
Subsistence agriculture is often seen as an important strategy for rural households to
deal with the hardships of transition (Seeth et al., 1998; Caskie, 2000; Kostov and Lingard,
2002).  Transition usually implies macroeconomic instability with high unemployment and
inflation.  Particularly in those countries where social security systems are inadequate and
markets for insurance are missing, subsistence production provides households with an
important buffer to survive.  For example, Cungu and Swinnen (1998) argue that Albania’s
reform has been so radical and spontaneous (in the sense that all collective structures have
been broken up), because farmers wanted to increase their food security, as a reaction to
dramatic adverse conditions under collective farming.
In many transition countries, farmers’ labor opportunity costs have decreased, as
transition involved closing unprofitable enterprises, thus restricting the labor outflow out of
agriculture (Macours and Swinnen, 2002).  In addition, most landowners are fairly old, as a
result of land restitution.  The opportunity costs of a rural pensioner are close to zero, due to
low pensions and difficulties to find work (Kostov and Lingard, 2002).  Subsistence farming
is hence a strategy to supplement low pensions.  The incentive to increase the level of
technology and to produce a surplus is low for these landowners, as the ability to work and
the propensity to take risk both decrease with age.  The level of pensions is thus a crucial
factor influencing the decision to keep a plot of land for subsistence production, or to sell or
lease it to others.
2.3. Transaction costs in factor and output markets
A final set of factors is related to potential barriers in factor and output markets that
prevent farmers to increase their production by using more inputs and better technology and
that limit the ability to market their surplus.  Particularly access to land, machinery and
services for marketing and input provision are crucial to increase farmers’ market orientation.6
While access to land can be enhanced by improving the functioning of the land sales and
lease market, access to machinery and services for marketing and input provision can only be
improved by some kind of cooperation among farmers, as was done in most market
economies.  Deininger (1995) argues that the new role of the old collective farms should be
to become service cooperatives.
Access to credit is also mentioned often as a major factor affecting the
commercialization of agriculture.  In most surveys, farmers state their lack of financial
resources as the single most important constraint to improve their situation or expand their
activities.  An important distinction must be made here before short term credit and long term
credit.  Access to long term credit is often limited in transition agriculture as banks do (or
can) not accept land as collateral.  However, demand for long term credit may actually be
low.  Farmers tend to finance long run investments predominantly with equity (Swinnen and
Gow, 1999; Lerman, 2001a).  Access to short term credit to finance working capital is often a
problem in transition agriculture, but does not necessarily have to be solved through
government intervention.  Short term credit can for example be supplied by buyers, or can be
part of contract arrangement (Gow and Swinnen, 1998).
3. Survey results from Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
3.1. Survey design
A consortium of the Policy Research Group at the Catholic University of Leuven
(Belgium), the Department of Economics of the University of Athens (Greece) and local
partners have carried out country-wide surveys in the period 1998-2000 in six countries:
Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.
2  The purpose of
                                                       
2 The surveys were financed in the framework of the European Union’s Phare ACE programme, projects P96-
6090-R and P97-8158-R, coordinated by Erik Mathijs (Belgium) and Alexander Sarris (Greece). Local country
coordinators include Ismail Beka (Albania), Diana Kopeva (Bulgaria), Emil Divila (Czech Republic), Tibor
Ferenczi (Hungary), Dinu Gavrilescu (Romania) and Peter Bielik (Slovakia).7
this research was to analyze the agricultural transition and farm restructuring process in
Central and Eastern European countries from a micro-economic perspective. Therefore,
countries such as Poland and Slovenia were excluded, as their agriculture was dominated by
private farms before the reforms.
The survey instruments were designed to enable comparative analysis between the six
countries.  They were assembled in a modular way to capture: (1) the background of the
household members (age, employment, etc.) or farm; (2) the performance of the agricultural
enterprise (land ownership and use, agricultural production, assets, inputs, financial
situation); (3) the household’s or farm’s non-agricultural activities and income; (3) the
household’s or farm’s intentions and perceived constraints to increase agricultural production
and/or non-agricultural income; and (4) the environment of the household or farm (social,
infrastructure, rurality, etc.).
The survey sampling procedure involved two samples, one of households (family
farms) and one of enterprises (cooperatives, companies).  The household sample involved a
two stage selection. First, villages were selected with probability proportional to size.
Second, a fixed number of households was selected in each village.  Farm enterprises were
selected randomly from a national list.  Due to cost limitations, the surveys were carried out
in typical regions in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, while the survey are national and
thus representative in all other countries.  These procedures resulted in the following samples:
• 1,411 households and 196 enterprises in Bulgaria, collected in 1998,
• 1,618 households and 404 enterprises in Hungary, collected in 1998,
• 1,676 households in Romania, collected in 1999,
• 400 registered and 200 unregistered family farms and 105 farm enterprises in the
Czech Republic, in the regions Brno and Jihlava (both in the south east), collected in
2000,8
• 412 registered family farms and 150 farm enterprises in Slovakia, in the regions Nitra
and Zilina, collected in 2000,
• 1,232 households in Albania, collected in 2000.
In the remainder of the paper, we will limit the discussion and analysis to Albania,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.  We can thus draw from four country-representative
samples.  The four countries represent a mix of middle income countries preparing for EU
accession (Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) and a relatively low income country not
preparing for accession (Albania).  Alternatively, we can compare a Central European
country (Hungary) with three Southeastern European or Balkan countries having similar
initial conditions (Bulgaria, Romania and Albania).  Albania’s Gross National Income per
capita (1,100 USD) is somewhat lower than the average of lower middle income countries,
while Bulgaria (1,510 USD) and Romania (1,670 USD) are above this average.  Hungary
(4,740 USD) is close to the average of upper middle income countries (see table 1).
Noteworthy is further that incomes are relatively unequally distributed in Albania compared
to the other three countries (table 2).
Following Macours and Swinnen (2002) the four countries can also be characterized
by their “pattern of transition”, as defined by their evolutions of agricultural output and labor
productivity during transition (also cfr. table 3 and 4):
• Hungary belongs to a group of countries (with the Czech Republic and Slovakia)
characterized by strong decline in agricultural output, but an even stronger decline in
agricultural employment resulting in an increase in agricultural labor productivity.
The shift from collective to individual tenure has been relatively limited, such that
large-scale farming still plays an important role (50-80% of total agricultural land).
Agriculture represents a relatively small share of the total economy (maximum 10%).9
• Albania belongs to a group of countries (with China and Vietnam) characterized by
growth in both agricultural output and agricultural labor productivity.  In Albania,
collective farms have completely disappeared.  Agriculture is still the country’s
largest sector (about 60%).
• Bulgaria follows a hybrid path (with Latvia and Lithuania) that closely resembles the
transition pattern of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and that is characterized by a strong
decline in output and labor productivity.  However, Bulgaria differs from for example
Russia, as it witnessed a significant shift towards individual farming (about 50% of
total agricultural land).  The share of agriculture in the economy is relatively large
(25%).
• Romania also follows a hybrid path (with Armenia and Georgia) that resembles
somewhat the Albania-China-Vietnam transition path.  However, output and labor
productivity increased only 2-3 years after the beginning of transition.  Agriculture is
a large sector (37%) dominated by family farms (67% of total agricultural land).
3.2. Survey results
We focus here on results that relate to the financial situation, marketing problems and
other constraints reported by the households in the different countries.  Table 5 reports the
own assessment of the household’s financial situation.  The results are as expected from the
per capita income data reported in table 1.  Only about 7% of Hungarian farming households
report that they cannot even cover their basic needs, while this is 45% in Albania.  Bulgarian
households are somewhat better off than Romanian households, which is opposite from their
ranking according to per capita income.  Despite their adverse situation, the majority of
Albanian households report that their financial situation is unchanged or has improved
compared to 1989 (almost 90%) and 1995 (80%).  This is the reverse in Bulgaria and10
particularly in Romania, where most households (about half in Bulgaria and three thirds in
Romania) report that their financial situation is worse than before (table 6).
Table 7 reports the main problems farmers face to market their output.  In Bulgaria
and Romania, lack of information on buyers and the fact that buyers will not come to the
farm are clearly the main constraints.  In Hungary, the fact that the farmer has to transport his
produce to the market, but also other reasons are more important.  Particularly in Romania
many farmers experience decreasing number of buyers over time (table 8).  Table 9 gives an
overview of the importance of various constraints to expand agricultural activity.  As in most
surveys, lack of financial resources is stated as the most important constraint, followed by
low prices received for products.  Interestingly, the latter is not a problem in Albania, where
access to land is more important.  In Hungary, high input prices is considered by three
quarters of all farmers as an important problem.  Payment delays are more important in
Hungary than in the other countries, probably because more products are sold on contract.
4. An empirical model of subsistence farming in transition
4.1. Methodology
To investigate the relative importance of household-specific characteristics, we use
data from the farm household surveys in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as
described before.  The share of households selling at least some of their production differs
greatly among the four countries: 36% in Romania, 38% in Bulgaria, 57% in Hungary and
84% in Albania.  Figure 1 provides the distribution of the amount of sales in Albania.  The
picture is similar in the other countries and also when sales per hectare are considered.
Lerman (2001a) suggests as a general rule that “two-thirds of household plots sell one-half of
their production”. However, this author also finds percentages of more than 80% in Moldova
and Armenia.  The figures for Bulgaria and Romania seem very low.11
To assess the effects of various household-specific factors on subsistence, we run a
Tobit regression with total sales and total sales per hectare as dependent variable:
(1) Si = S(Xi,Zi) for all farms.
where S represents total sales in domestic currency; X is a set of household specific variables
(age and education of the household head, household size, income situation, car ownership,
membership in a cooperative or agricultural enterprise, and distance to the nearest regional
centre), and Z is a set of farm specific variables reflecting the farm’s resources (land,
machinery and livestock).  Table 10 provides the definitions of the variables used in the
regression analyses.
We also test whether commercialization is actually a two-stage decision problem,
following Cragg (1971), Heckman (1979) and Goetz (1992).
3  In a first stage, households
decide whether or not they sell any surplus of their agricultural production.  The equation of
the first stage is estimated with a probit analysis.  In a second stage, those households who
decided to sell, decide how much produce they will market.  This equation is estimated by
ordinary least squares.  The following models are estimated:
(2) Di = D(Xi,Zi) for all farms with Di=0 if Si=0 and Di=1 if Si>0
(3) Si = S(Xi,Zi) for Di=1.
Table 11 summarizes the mean values for the explanatory variables for sellers and
non-sellers:
• Age: Household heads are particularly old in Bulgaria and Romania.  Figure 2
reveals an almost perfect negative relationship between commercialization and
average age.  Sellers are younger then non-sellers, except in Albania.
• Education: The level of education is relatively high in all countries (8 to 9 years of
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whether to participate in coarse grain markets separate from the continuous decision of how much to sell or buy,
conditional on participation.  However, contrary to Goetz (1992), we consider all products and we do not
consider the buying decision.12
schooling).  While sellers are better educated than non-sellers, the differences are
small.
• Household size: Albanian families (5 members) are larger than families in the
associated countries (3 members).  Sellers have somewhat larger families than
non-sellers.
• Income: Income is consistently higher for sellers than non-sellers.
• Car ownership: Sellers are more likely to own a car than non-sellers.  In Bulgaria
and Hungary, more farmers own a car than in Romania and particularly in
Albania.
• Membership: Sellers are more likely to be a member of a cooperative than non-
sellers in Hungary and Romania.
• Land: Sellers have consistently larger land holdings than non-sellers.  Subsistence
farmers cultivate between on average half a hectare in Albania to 2.5 ha in
Hungary.  Holdings are much smaller in Albania than in the associated countries
and are the largest in Hungary.
• Machinery: Sellers are more likely to own at least one piece of equipment than
non-sellers.  Machinery ownership is relatively high in Bulgaria (40-66%) and
Hungary (35-51%) compared to Romania and Albania, where virtually no
households own machinery.
• Livestock: The amount of livestock owned is consistently higher for sellers than
non-sellers.  Livestock ownership is much higher in Hungary than in the Balkan
countries.
• Distance: Sellers are located slightly further away from the market than non-
sellers, except in Albania.  Distances are large in Bulgaria (70-80 km) and small in
Albania (about 10 km).13
4.2. Regression results
The results from the various regression analyses are summarized in tables 12-14.
Table 12 presents the results with the logarithm of sales as dependent variable.  We tested the
sensitivity of the results to heteroskedasticity by running the Tobit regression also with sales
divided by the amount of land (output could not be calculated in a consistent way for all four
countries) (table 13).  Finally, we excluded income from the latter regression to avoid
problems of endogeneity.  Further, the results of the Heckman procedure are not reported, as
none of the Heckman regressions was significant.  In other words, the selection regression
dominates the allocation to such an extent that the latter provides no additional information.
This suggests that to market food, households have to take a considerable hurdle.  Hence, we
will limit our discussion to the Tobit results.  The following results were obtained:
• Age has a negative impact on commercialization in all countries, but only
significantly so in the associated countries, not in Albania.
• Education has no impact on commercialization in Albania, Romania and Hungary.  In
Bulgaria better educated rural household members are less market oriented, which
suggests that they spent more time off-farm.
• Household size is not significant for the Balkan countries. Only in Hungary, the
impact of this variable on the farms’ sales is significant and negative, which suggests
that smaller households are able to generate a larger marketable surplus.
• Income is positively related to sales, and significantly so in the Balkan countries.
However, one has to be cautious with the interpretation of this variable as its effect
can run both ways: households may be richer because they are market oriented, but
access to off-farm income sources may also be an important precondition to escape
from subsistence.
• Car ownership, which can be interpreted as a proxy for asset ownership that is less14
susceptible to endogeneity than income, has a significant positive effect in Albania,
but a significant negative effect in Romania.  However, the latter becomes
insignificant when income is omitted as an explanatory variable.
• Membership in a cooperative or agricultural enterprise has a positive and significant
effect on commercialization in Hungary and Romania, and a negative, but
insignificant, impact in Bulgaria. (There are no cooperatives in Albania.)  This
suggests that cooperative structures enhance the access to services.
• Land is significant and positive for all countries, suggesting that farms need to be
enlarged to become more market oriented, and that land markets are not functioning.
• Machinery ownership has a significant and positive impact on commercialization in
Albania and Bulgaria, but a significantly negative effect in Hungary.  The latter is
surprising as the summary statistics have shown that a larger share of sellers own
machinery (51%) than non-sellers (35%).
• Livestock has a significant positive effect in the Balkan countries, but is insignificant
in Hungary, where the livestock index is on average three times higher than in the
other countries.
• Distance has a positive effect on sales in all countries, but only significantly so in
Bulgaria and Romania. This suggests that people living nearby a major town, while
having better access to output markets, have also better access to labor markets, and
hence commercialize less of their produce.
The results do not change when the variable “sales” is replaced by “sales per hectare”.
Excluding income as explanatory variable has minor impacts on the regression results.
4.3. Discussion
The regression results confirm the relationship between age and subsistence suggested
in figure 2, and thus the importance of demographics as pointed out for instance by Kostov15
and Lingard (2002).  Particularly in Bulgaria and Romania, there is a high incidence of
pensioners and subsistence farming, signaling poor social security networks that withhold
these farmers to rent out or sell their land to more efficient farmers.  Lack of land is,
however, a major constraint in all four countries, suggesting too small farm sizes and badly
functioning land markets, a situation identified by Lerman (2001a) as the most important
constraint to break out of subsistence in most transition countries.  However, as the problem
of badly functioning land markets is often attributed to badly defined property rights, our
results suggest that the problem is rather one of lack of supply of land, as land is also a
constraint in countries where property rights are strong.
Access to machinery and market services is an important precondition to improve
productivity, generate a surplus and take it to the market.  Lack of machinery is clearly a
constraint in Albania, where very few households own a piece of machinery and Bulgaria,
where half of the farmers own machinery, but not enough to become fully market oriented
farmers.  However, machinery ownership is certainly not a necessary condition as shown by
the case of Romania, where very few households own machinery, but machinery does not
seem to be a constraint.  Machinery ownership even has a negative impact on
commercialization in Hungary, a phenomenon we cannot explain.  In Hungary and Romania,
however, membership in a cooperative significantly enhances market orientation.  We cannot
conclude whether this is because of better access to inputs and machinery or because of better
marketing opportunities, but the fact that the effect is strong and highly significant suggests
that cooperatives play an important role in solving market imperfections, as suggested e.g. by
Deininger (1995).
Although the share of cooperatives in total agricultural land has largely declined
during transition (see table 3), the existence of highly fragmented land structures, lack of
machinery and high transaction costs in the output markets warrants their importance as16
service cooperatives.  It must be noted that other institutions, such as contracts, can also be
very successful in improving access to inputs and marketing (see e.g. Gow and Swinnen,
1998).  Noteworthy (although the effect is not significant) is the negative impact of
membership in Bulgaria, where private farmers rely more on their own resources and
managerial capabilities than on the experience of cooperatives. Additionally, Bulgarian
cooperatives are still burdened with financial debts and more importantly, the assets and the
services they provide are less efficient and of worse quality compared to the private ones.
4
Finally, access to finance is often mentioned as an important condition to increase
commercialization.  Unfortunately, we were not able to include variables that would reflect
the importance of access to credit in our analysis.  Higher off-farm income implies that more
own funds are available for farm investment.  Some authors thus interpret income as a
measure for liquidity constraints (e.g., Rizov et al., 2001).
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
As the transition from planned to market economy is characterized by macro-
economic instability, high unemployment and limited access to land and capital, the
cultivation of small household plots remains a reliable source for food provision.  In regions
where off-farm opportunities are limited, agriculture is still the main source of income.  Both
output and factor markets are still underdeveloped, and in addition, many rural households in
transition countries have no access to them.  In this paper, we have used farm survey data
from four transition countries to investigate to what extent patterns of subsistence can be
explained by household specific characteristics and endowments.  In other words, we wanted
to identify those factors that inhibit farming households in transition agriculture to participate
in the market and escape from subsistence.  Identifying these constraints can give direction to
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where rural development policies should put their priorities.  The results of our econometric
analysis show that there is still a considerable hurdle to be taken to produce a marketable
surplus, and that household-specific characteristics and endowments contribute to explaining
why farmers stay in subsistence farming.  Based on our results, we would like to formulate
two particular policy recommendations.
First, age plays a prominent role when analyzing subsistence agriculture in transition
economies, particularly in countries were land was restituted to former owners.  Landowners
are relatively old and have a low incentive to transfer their land to more efficient users.  This
seems to lock the land market, which is confirmed by the observation that land significantly
affects commercialization in all countries, including in Hungary where property rights are
strong.  Social security systems hence play a key role in solving subsistence.  Nevertheless,
policies improving the functioning of the land lease market, at the development of the land
sales market and at the consolidation of fragmented farm structures are still necessary in all
four countries, as there is a strong relationship between land and commercialization.
Second, our results suggest that forms of cooperation can solve market imperfections
and reduce the hurdle to the market.  The conversion of existing cooperatives into service
cooperatives and the creation of new forms of cooperation should be stimulated to increase
the access to machinery and market services, particularly in Albania and Bulgaria, where
these institutions are missing.
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Figure 1. Distribution of sales in Albania
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Low income 420 1,990
Middle income 1,970 5,650
Lower middle income 1,140 4,580
Upper middle income 4,620 9,170
High income 27,510 27,450
Europe & Central Asia 2,010 6,620
Latin America & Caribbean 3,680 7,030
European Monetary Union 22,000 23,670
World 5,150 7,350
a Atlas Methodology.
b Purchasing Power Parity.
Source: World Bank, 2001 World Development Indicators Database.22
Table 2.  Inequality in income or consumption for selected transition countries






















Hungary 1998 4.1 10.0 34.4 20.5 5 3.5 24.4
Bulgaria 1997 4.5 10.1 36.8 22.8 5 3.6 26.4
Romania 1994 3.7 8.9 37.3 22.7 6.1 4.2 28.2
Albania 1995 2.2 5.4 49.7 33.8 15.4 9.2 43.7
Poland 1998 3.2 7.8 39.7 24.7 7.8 5.1 31.6
Slovak R. 1992 5.1 11.9 31.4 18.2 3.6 2.6 19.5
Czech R. 1996 4.3 10.3 35.9 22.4 5.2 3.5 25.4
Russian
Federation
1998 1.7 4.4 53.7 38.7 23.3 12.2 48.7
Ukraine 1999 3.7 8.8 37.8 23.2 6.4 4.3 29.0
Note: Surveys in Hungary, Albania, Poland, Russian Federation and Ukraine based on consumption; surveys in
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovak republic and Czech Republic based on income.
a Data show the ratio of the income or consumption share of the richest group to that of the poorest. Because of
rounding, results may differ from ratios calculated using the income or consumption shares in columns 3-6.
b The Gini Index measures inequality over the entire distribution of income or consumption. A value of 0
represents perfect equality, and a value of 100 perfect inequality.
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001.
Table 3. Evolution of organisational structures in Central and East European agriculture
Collective/Co-
operative farms
State farms New co-
operative farms
Individual farms
Pre-1990 1998 Pre-1990 1998 current Pre-1990 1998
Share of arable land in %
Albania 74 - 22 20  - 4 80
Bulgaria 58 42 29 6  - 13 52
Czech Republic 61 43 38 2 32 0 23
Hungary 80 28 14 4 14 6 54
Romania 59 12 29 21  - 12 67
Slovak Republic 69 60 26 15 20 5 5
Average size (ha)
Albania 1053  - 1588  -  - 0.1 1.4
Bulgaria 4000 637 1615 735  - 0.4 1.4
Czech Republic 2578 1447 9443 521 690 5.0 2.7
Hungary 4179 833 7138 7779 204 0.3 3.0
Romania 2374 451 5001 3657  - 0.5 2.7
Slovak Republic 2667 1509 5186 3056 1191 0.3 7.7
Source: European Commission, 199823














1991 1995 1998 1991 1995 1998 1991 1995 1998 1990-99 1998-99
Hungary 17.9 8.9 8.2
c
4.7 10.4 8.0 21.5 17.7 n.a. 21.5 10.0
Bulgaria
b 19.1 23.3 24.7 11.1 11.1 12.2 47.0 46.0 48.0 129.3 2.6
Romania
a 27.5 33.6 37.3
c
3.0 9.5 10.3 55.0 57.5 59.0 108.9 45.8
Albania 49.0 64.6 64.0 9.1 12.9 16.9 63.0 72.1 73.0  32.1
c
0.4
a Includes employment in the processing sector.
b Average share of household income spent on food includes food produced in households.
c Data for 1996.
Source: OECD 2000; UNDP, Human Development Report 2000/2001.
Table 5. Household financial situation, %
Bulgaria Romania Hungary Albania
Households with income not even enough to buy food 26.5 40.9 6.7 45.3
Households with income enough only for food 31.3 45.3 30.1 39.1
Households with income enough for food and
necessities, but not for other expenses
37.1 11.3 46.5 14.9
Households with income enough to meet all their needs 5.1 2.5 16.7 0.7
Note: Results are based on the own assessment of the interviewed.
Source: Own calculations based on Phare ACE Surveys 1998-2000.







1992 1996 1990 1996 1997 1989 1995
Much more improved 3.5 1.9 1.1 0.5 0.3 11.1 1.2
Improved 12.3 13.8 6.1 5.3 4.4 58.9 38.2
Unchanged/Similar 22.1 36.6 11.1 17.4 26.8 19.4 41.0
Worse 25.6 25.5 41.2 52.5 52.6 9.3 17.9
Much worse 36.5 22.2 40.4 24.4 15.8 1.3 1.8
Note: Results are based on the own assessment of the interviewed.
Source: Own calculations based on Phare ACE Surveys 1998-2000.24
Table 7. Main constraints* for farmers to find buyers for their output, %
crop production livestock production
Bulgaria Romania Hungary Bulgaria Romania Hungary
Buyers will not come to the farm 73.9 22.8 36.8 56.4 27.7 25.7
Volume of output is too low 42.1 11.4 27.1 32.7 18.8 22.2
We do not know many buyers 66.7 36.7 20.9 61.2 30.7 11.5
We do not know the market price 38.6 10.1 15.6 28.3 6.9 14.2
Other reasons 31.6 19.0 37.7 7.3 15.8 31.1
Total - 100.00 - - 100.00 -
*Answers are given only for the households that have difficulties in finding buyers for their output. In Romania,
respondents were asked to consider only the most important reason. In Bulgaria and Hungary, respondents were
asked to consider whether a particular reason was important or not. Here, the figures reflect the share of
households that considers this constraint to be important.
Source: Own calculations based on Phare ACE Surveys 1998-2000.







1992 1996 1996 1997 1993 1996
crop production
More buyers 45.6 41.8 11.5 8.5 37.9 20.3
Less buyers 30.6 31.0 44.1 42.0 23.6 28.3
The same 23.8 27.2 44.5 49.5 38.5 51.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
livestock production
More buyers 57.4 56.3 17.1 11.6 35.7 19.6
Less buyers 20.5 25.2 35.9 35.9 20.6 24.5
The same 22.1 18.5 47.0 52.5 43.7 55.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on Phare ACE Surveys 1998-2000.25
Table 9. Constraints for increasing the agricultural activity, %















Cannot obtain more land 37.0 15.1 10.3 2.6 17.2 6.7 13.0 23.8 63.2
Cannot obtain loans/credit 16.0 16.8 6.7 5.4 13.0 14.9 27.3 14.5 58.2
Cannot find labor 8.0 10.1 5.0 5.2 8.1 9.5 15.1 23.8 61.1
Cannot sell the products 16.8 19.3 14.1 12.0 5.5 10.7 35.4 29.8 34.8
Not enough financial resources 58.0 17.7 41.6 20.6 35.7 11.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Low prices of the products 46.2 20.6 11.4 27.8 8.1 21.3 68.3 13.9 17.9
Delayed payments from buyers 10.5 20.2 0.6 2.8 0.1 0.4 24.2 29.2 46.6
High input prices 35.7 11.8 4.3 15.0 3.6 12.4 78.5 7.4 14.1
Cannot find suppliers of inputs 4.2 11.3 0.4 1.3 0.0 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cannot obtain own land from
enterprise (or association)
7.6 7.1 0.0 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Policy problems (difficulties with
dealing with the state)
13.0 8.4 0.5 0.5 n.a. n.a. 30.7 23.8 45.5
Problems with agr. company or co-
operative
6.3 14.3 0.3 0.2 n.a. n.a. 17.1 25.7 57.2
Agriculture is less profitable than
other activities of the household
19.8 16.8 2.4 4.1 0.8 2.1 82.9 17.1 0.0






No constraints 7.6 6.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 7.9
a
- -
Total - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - -
a From the total number of observations in the sample.
Note: In Romania and Albania, respondents were asked to rank the three most important constraints.  Respondents in Hungary gave their assessment of each constraint.
Respondents in Bulgaria indicated all the constraints they consider as the most important, then those constraints they find important, etc.
Source: Own calculations based on Phare ACE Surveys 1998-2000.26
Table 10. Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Sales Amount of sales, in local currency, realised by the household
Age Age of the household head
Education Years of schooling of household head
Household size Number of household members (including children)
Income Categorical variable: 1 = household income is not even enough for food, 2 =
enough only for food, 3 =  enough for food and necessities, but not for other
expenses, 4 = enough to meet all the household’s needs
Car Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household owns at least one car, and 0
otherwise
Member Dummy variable that equals 1 if a household member belongs to a co-operative,
association or other agricultural enterprise, and 0 otherwise
Livestock Weighted index for owned livestock
Land Land cultivated by the farm household in hectares
Machinery Dummy variable that equals 1 if the household owns some agricultural
machinery, and 0 otherwise
Distance Distance of the household’s farm to the nearest regional centre
Table 11. Summary statistics (mean) of variables, by non-sellers and sellers
Albania Bulgaria Hungary Romania
Variable non-
sellers
sellers non-sellers sellers non-sellers sellers non-
sellers
sellers
Age 49.20 50.22 63.53 59.82 56.56 53.86 64.44 62.43
Education 9.16 9.28 8.96 9.27 7.41 8.68 8.49 9.00
Household size 4.90 5.14 2.85 3.37 3.11 3.22 2.94 3.16
Income 1.45 1.78 2.13 2.53 1.74 2.03 1.66 1.90
Car 0.03 0.08 0.33 0.46 0.49 0.66 0.15 0.21
Member n.a. n.a. 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.28 0.18 0.24
Livestock 2.55 4.55 4.03 6.26 3.56 18.08 3.70 6.61
Land 0.51 1.12 1.40 3.58 2.55 10.49 2.39 3.60
Machinery 0.00 0.04 0.40 0.66 0.35 0.51 0.08 0.14
Distance 11.06 10.44 72.63 83.26 41.76 45.76 43.25 50.84
Sales 0.00 1,676,004 0.00 2,480,771 0.00 455,253 0.00 5,401,857
Observations 152 775 534 329 446 590 946 523
Total number of
observations
927 863 1036 146927
Table 12. Tobit regression results with ln(sales) as dependent variable























































































Log likelihood -2492.45 -1356.97 -2643.27 -2259.12
Note: Coefficients are given with p-values between brackets.  Coefficients significant at 10% level are
indicated in bold.
Source: own calculations28
Table 13. Tobit regression results with ln(sales/land) as dependent variable























































































Log likelihood -2400.74 -1539.54 -2615.41 -2276.39
Note: Coefficients are given with p-values between brackets.  Coefficients significant at 10% level are
indicated in bold.
Source: own calculations29
Table 14. Tobit regression results with ln(sales/land) as dependent variable and income
excluded as explanatory variable
















































































Log likelihood -2404.78 -1548.56 -2624.70 -2277.05
Note: Coefficients are given with p-values between brackets.  Coefficients significant at 10% level are
indicated in bold.
Source: own calculations